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THE TEST OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION*
Gerald M. Stevens t

L

ABOR'S status is the subject of what seems to be an interminable
war, with campaigns in the courts, on picket lines, in conference
rooms, and in legislative halls. The prominence of these battles increases, if anything, the obscurity in which a closely related conflict is
being worked out. For as long as there are important distinctions to be
made on the basis of whether an employment relation exists, there is
fairly certain to be at least some argument over the existence of that
relation.
And important distinctions are made. 1 Whether it is a familiar claim
such as an employer's liability for the tort of his alleged employee or
his duty to provide common-law or statutory compensation to an injured employee; or a less known advantage such as a preference under
insolvency statutes 2 or exemption of employees' wages from garnishment; 3 or a comparative innovation such as the duty to pay social
security taxes 4 or to pay a statutory minimum wage 5-all of these legal
problems and others include the possibility of having to distinguish
employment from other relationships. 6
The pivotal importance of the employer-employee relationship
under the recent statutory developments 1 warrants re-examination of an
old and well-discussed issue. 8 For throughout the wide and increasing

* This article is based on a portion of a thesis written in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Laws at the University of Michigan Law
School.-E d.
B.S., North Dakota State; J.D., Michigan; member of the North Dakota bar.
-Ed.
1 This list is, of course, merely suggestive and is not intended to be complete.
2 See Kauper, "Insolvency Statutes Preferring Wages Due Employees," 30
M1cH. L. REV. 504 (1932).
3 See, e.g., Shahan v. Biggs & Co., (Tex. Civ. APP.· 1938) 123 S. W. (2d)
686; Huck-Gerhardt Co. v. Davies, 134 Pa. Super. 430, 3 A. (2d) 963 (1939).
4 Decisions by the Internal Revenue Bureau on this question, e.g., occupy a large
proportion of the INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN numbers since the latter half of
1936.
5 The statutory provisions involved are 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), §§ 203 (e),
206 (a).
6 These distinguishable relationships prove more often .than not to be varieties of
that all-inclusive non-employment relation, the "independent contract."
7 The Internal Revenue Bureau alone published over 200 decisions on the
employment relation under the national Social Security Act during the first three
years after its passage. See issues of the INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN.
8 These are a few of the notes provoked by the problem in the field of work-
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scope of application of the employment relation a single standardized
criterion of its existence has been utilized almost to the exclusion of
any other. Perhaps greater familiarity with the development of that
test will deprive it of some of its seeming inevitability and pave the
way for further consideration of possible alternatives.
ORIGIN OF THE CONTROL TEST

The relation of employer and employee is, of course, that formerly known under the title of master and servant. The shift to the
first terminology seems to have accompanied the development of
workmen's compensation legislation, which makes clear the substantial identity of the two. And it was in determining the scope of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior that definition
of this relation became important. Thus the Agency Restatement's
definition is catalogued under "Liability of Principal to Third Person;
Torts." 9
The orthodox modern definition of the master-servant relation
is mainly in terms of the employer's right of control:
"in all cases the relation imports the existence of power in the
employer not only to direct what work the servant is to do,
but also the manner in which the work is to be done." 10
men's compensation: 6 CAL. L. REv. 235 (1918); 70 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 343
(1922); 17 ILL. L. REv. 388 (1923); 12 MrnN. L. REv. 83 (1927); Williams,
"Distinction between 'Employee' and 'Independent Contractor,'" 2 CoNN. BAR J.
282 (1928); 19 CAL. L. REV. 220 (1931); 5 TEMPLE L. Q. 478 (1931); 18
lowA L. REV. 525 (1933); 9 IND. L. J. 262 (1934); 35 CoL. L. REv. 1325
(1935); 84 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 558 (1936); 12 Wis. L. REv. 219 (1937).
9 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 220 (1933).
10 22 HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND, Hailsham (2d) ed., p. II2 (1936). See
also 18 R. C. L. 490 (1917). The AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 220 (1933), is a little
less certain:
"(1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in his
affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service,
is subject to the other's control or right of control.
"(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
"(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
"(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
"{c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
i~ !15ually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervmon;
"(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
"(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
'
"{f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
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It is reasonable to expect that the accepted definition should
accord with the accepted theory of the principle of respondeat superior. But there exists no single accepted theory of the rule of liability for a servant's negligence or other uncommanded wrongs. Baty
listed no less than nine theories together with the most prominent supporters of each and amassed a considerable body of opinion to the
effect that the rule was quite unjust and illogical.11 The author
~ummed up his own position thus:
"Unknown to the classical jurisprudence of Rome, unfamiliar to
the mediaeval jurisprudence of England, it has attained its luxuriant growth through carelessness and false analogy...." 12
Of the suggested rationales of the rule one of the most important
is, of course, that the master can control his servant's actions. But it
may be worth inquiring how this particular one of the much disputed
and doubted theories in justification of the rule came to be the standard definition of persons within the rule.
The earliest English case which applies the control test in terms
that sound distinctly modern is Sadler v. Henlock 18 in 1855. There
the defendant hired a common laborer to clear a drain running from
the defendant's land under the highway. The defendant chose the
particular laborer for the job because the latter had installed the
drain in the first instance. Due to the workman's negligence the highway was left in disrepair, and plaintiff suffered injury thereby. The
trial judge instructed the jury that the laborer was to be regarded as a
servant of the landowner; and the consequent verdict for the plaintiff
was sustained in Queen's Bench. Lord Campbell and Crompton, J.,
found the relationship of master and servant almost solely from the
apparent power of control in the landowner, while Wightman, J.,
inclined to emphasize the fact that the laborer had no independent
employment. Lord Campbell remarked:
"The defendant might have said, 'fill up the hole in the road,
but not as you are now doing it, lest, when a horse goes over the
"(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
"(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
and

"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of
master and servant.»
l1 BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 146-154 (1916).
12 Ibid., p. 7.
18 + El. & Bl. 570, u9 Eng. Rep. 209 (1855).
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place, he may be injured.' Pearson was therefore the defendant'.:;
servant..••" 14
But it was Crompton who was apparently most responsible for
actually formulating a "test" of the relationship. Any one of the
following passages alone would have established his claim to being
first in England to state unequivocally the criterion of control:
[arguendo] "Is not this rather a case where the employer maintains a control over the person wh9m he employs? A contractor
chooses the mode in which the work is done, and the persons
who do it. I thought the principle of the cases, which are cases
of difficulty, was that the contractor had this power of choice." 15

[ arguendo] "In Milligan v. Wedge . . . the Court must have
supposed that the defendant could not interfere with the management of the beast." 16
"I decide, not on the ground that Pearson did not employ the
hands of another ... tjiough it is true that such employment may
sometimes be a test as to whether the employer was a servant or
an independent contractor. The test here is, whether the defendant retained the power of controlling the work." 17
The judges in Sadler v. H enlock are not reported to have relied
on any previous cases for their judgment of the point in question, but
counsel of course made full citation of the authorities. One of these
earlier cases cited was Milligan v. Wedge, 18 a familiar landmark in
the development of tests for the employment relation. 19 The facts are
familiar: the defendant, a butcher, hired a licensed drover to drive a
bullock through London to the butcher's establishment outside the
city. Only licensed drovers were permitted to drive for hire in the
city. The drover in turn hired a boy to herd the defendant's and four
other bullocks through the streets. The defendant's animal escaped
its custodian and damaged the plaintiff's shop. In affirming a decision
for the defendant on the ground that the drover was an independent
14

Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. & Bl. 570 at 577, II 9 Eng. Rep. 209 ( I 8 5 5).
Ibid., 4 El. & Bl. at 575. Italics added.
18
Ibid., at 576.
u Ibid., at 578.
18
rz Adol. & El. 737, II3 Eng. Rep. 993 (1840).
19
See, e.g., Leidy, "Salesmen as Independent Contractors," 28 M1cH. L. REv.
365 (1930). Professor Leidy criticizes the usual test of control and suggests that of
"independent calling'' as preferable. The discussion is based largely on Milligan v.
Wedge.
111
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contractor rather than a servant, the judges used both tests: that of
control and that of independent calling. In connection with the case
at least two of the judges stressed the distinct occupation of the
licensed drover. On the other hand, the control test was relied on
merely to distinguish the troublesome case of Randleson v. Murray.2°
Thus it appears that as late as 1840, the date of Milligan v. Wedge,
the line of authority for testing the employment relation by reference
to the power of control on the part of the alleged master was extremely weak and thin. Both the tests, indeed, were at most suggestions thrown out as possible grounds for characterizing and distinguishing two isolated situations not viewed as necessarily representative of any general principle.
The bothersome decision of Randleson v. Murray was decided
in I 83 8 and, typical of that time, contained no intelligible allusion
to the problem of tests of the master-servant relation. And its holding
that a warehouseman was liable for the negligence of the employee of a
master carter employed by a master porter employed by the warehouseman seems by now to be quite clearly out of the main course of
decision of that time.21 On the other hand, Quarman v. Burnett,22
decided by the Court of Exchequer, was considered to control the
decision in Milligan v. Wedge. And that case, like Randleson v. Murray, cannot be interpreted as attempting to state a definitive test of
the master-servant relation. Backwards in time from Quarman v.
Burnett, the strongest link in this chain of precedent is the leading
but indecisive case of Laugher v. Pointer.23 Both cases raised the
question of liability for the negligence of the driver of a hired team
of horses attached to a carriage owned by the lessee. Laugher v.
Pointer was finally decided by an even division of the four judges of
King's Bench after the case had been heard before twelve judges in
Serjeants' Inn Hall (who also were divided). From the four separate
opinions rendered, practically nothing can be discerned apropos of
8 Adol. & El. 109, II2 Eng. Rep. 777 (1838).
Randleson v. Murray was, however, "distinguished" by contemporary judges.
See, e.g., Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (1840),
distinguishing between negligence of a contractor in regard to land and in regard
to movable property. In the former situation the owner and contractee was thought
to be liable. This distinction is the part of Bush v. Steinman most definitely repudiated
in Reedie v. London & N. W. Ry., 4 Exch. 244, 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849).
See note 31, infra.
22 6 Mees. & W. 499, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (1840).
23 5 Barn. & Cress. 547, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (1826). This case forms the basis
of Story's original discussion of the problem cited in subsequent English cases. See
STORY, AGENCY, § 452 (1839).
20

21
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the question of control. Perhaps the nearest is Chief Justice Abbott's
pointing out that the lessee of the horses probably could not order
their.driver to turn them over to another person. It was Abbott's and
Littledale's opinions that prevailed in Laugher v. Pointer by the
equal division, and these same opinions were eventually approved by
the Court of Exchequer in Quarman v. Burnett.
Sadler v. H enlock, then, may be considered the starting point of
the modern doctrine of control. Back of it the most direct line of
authority is through Quarman v. Burnett to Laugher v. Pointer; in
that line express mention of the test begins only with Sadler v. Hen-lock. One other case here discussed may actually have contributed:
Milligan v. Wedge. And one other ought to be mentioned. In Allen
v. Hayward 24 the court appended a query as to the rule if an accident occurred in the course of work which the contractor had agreed
to do according to his contractee's instructions and directions. Such a
hypothetical case was being distinguished from that actually presented: the work being done was part of that specified and described
in the contract and left entirely to the contractor.
As late as I 849, in Ree-die v. London & N. W. Ry.,2 5 the power
of selection was stressed to the exclusion of the power of control. This
passage has been much cited:
"The party employing has the selection of the party employed,
and it is reasonable that he who has made choice of an unskilful
or careless person to execute his orders, should be responsible
for any injury resulting from the want of skill or want of care
of the person employed...•" 26
From the whole tenor of the case as well as from this quotation,
it appears that the court was speaking in terms of a rationale of the
doctrine of respondeat superior rather than of a test for the existence
of the necessary relation. For the tortfeasor's being the servant of an
independent contractor and not of the defendant in the action was
obviously thought too clear for discussion. And a later section of the
opinion supports the contention that no test is under consideration.
Baron Rolfe denies that the case is influenced by the contractee's having reserved the power of dismissing its contractor's employees for
incompetence, citing Quarman v. Burnett, in which the defendant
was said actually to have selected the servant of his contractor and
yet was held not liable.
24

7 Q. B. 960, II5 Eng. Rep. 749 (1845).
4 Exch. 244, 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849).
26
Ibid., 4 Exch. at 25 5.

25
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It should be pointed out that the American courts were a trifle
quicker than their English contemporaries to seize upon Blackstone's 2 '
control rationale of respondeat superior as the logical test of the
master-servant relation. The leading case is undoubtedly Boswell
v. Laird,28 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1857. A dam
under construction by a contractor burst, injuring the plaintiff's property. Suit was against the land owner who was having the dam built.
In an extended opinion Justice Field discussed thoroughly the English cases preceding Sadler v. Henlock. (It appears that the report of
that case itself had not yet become available.) But the language of
his reference to the control test obviously is not derived from those
English cases:
"Something more than the mere right of selection, on the part of
the principal, is essential to [ the relation of master and servant].
That right must be accompanied with the power of subsequent
control, in the execution of the work contracted for. In the present case, that power was wanting, and, of course, the relation to
which it was essential did not exist." 29
These words are not the product of the English cases on which
Justice Field purports to found his decision but rather of a similar
passage in the New York case of Blake v. Ferris,8° which he 9tes
merely as confirming the doctrine of the English cases. Blake v.
Ferris anticipates Sadler v. H enlock by five years. But it in turn is
based solely upon substantially the same English cases that were
available to the English judges in the later case. It is the forerunner
of Boswell v. Laird also in pointing out that the trend of the English
decisions was away from the apparent holding of Bush v. Steinman. 81
Both English and American courts, then, may be considered to
have reached the control test independently of each other about I 850,
after at least a half century during which the issue was potentially
See note 3 2, infra.
8 Cal. 469, 68 Am. Dec. 345 (1857).
29 Ibid., 8 Cal. at 489.
so I Selden (5 N. Y.) 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304 (1851). Compare the following
passage, I Selden at 54, with that quoted in the text from Boswell v. Laird: "[The
rule of respondeat superior] is founded on the power which the superior has a right
to exercise, and which for the prevention of injuries to third persons he is bound to
exercise, over the acts of his subordinates. Therefore the rule can not be applicable to
cases where no such power exists." This is the clearest statement the writer has seen
in the early cases of the transition from rationale of vicarious liability to test of the
master-servant relation.
ai I Bos. & Pul. 404, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (1799). Disapproved, Reedie v.
London & N. W. Ry., 4 Exch. 244 at 256, 257, 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (1849).
27

28
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before the English courts in frequent cases. For it was not for want
of the suggestion that the control test was not earlier adopted in
England. In 1799 in the case of Bush v. Steinman, later discredited,
it was apparently refused recognition as the proper means of defining
the liability for the torts of another under the principle of respondeat
superior. That case raised the question of the responsibility of a
property owner for the negligence of a servant of a remote subcontractor who was engaged in repairing the defendant's house. Counsel
for the defendant clearly argued the control test, citing Blackstone's
statement:
"A master is, lastly, chargeable, if any of his family layeth or
casteth anything out of his house into the street or common highway, to the damage of any individual, or the common nuisance
... for the master hath the superintendence and charge of all his
household." 82
The passage quoted is obviously intended by its author as a rationalization of the somewhat strange doctrine of vicarious liability. But
counsel in citing it for the defendant invoke its converse as a test of the
questioned relation. Rejecting by implication the argument so founded,
the court clearly thought that the defendant's ownership of the property and his benefiting from the activity there carried on was sufficient reason for holding him liable. If the element of control entered
into the opinions at all, it was in the fact that the court imposed upon
the defendant the duty of control in such a situation. 88
For some reason not apparent, the English courts thus long refused to adopt Blackstone's theory of the reason of the rule of respondeat superior as the test of the relationship necessary for its
application. Whatever may have been the cause of the protracted
delay, the eventual outcome, now well known, can be better understood after an examination of another line of judicial opinion, expressed, it is true, largely in dicta. In Quarman v. Burnett the following significant language occurs:
"It is undoubtedly true, that there may be special circumstances
which render the hirer of job-horses and servants responsible for
the neglect of a servant, though not liable by virtue of the general relation of master and servant. He may become so by his own
conduct, as by taking the actual management of the horses, or
82

1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs 431 (1765).
Rook, J., in Bush v. Steinman, I Bos. & Pul. 404 at 409,
(1799).
38

I

26 Eng. Rep. 978
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ordering the servant to drive in a particular manner, which
occasions the damage complained of, or to absent himself at one
particular moment, and the like." 34
It is this approach which is adopted in the discussions of the element of control in subsequent cases. Where it is not mentioned merely
in passing as a suggested rationale of the whole doctrine of vicarious
liability, it is thus used to create liability where the relation of master
and servant is at the outset assumed not to exist. The following passages are typical:
"Here it does not appear that the defendant attended the drover
or his servant...." 35 ·
"The defendants not having personally interfered or given any
directions as to the performance of the work, but merely having
contracted with a third person to do it, cannot be held responsible
for an unauthorized and unlawful act of such third person in the
course of it. It is quite true, as was said in Bush v. Steinman, that
the original contractor might be liable equally with the subcontractor, if he in any manner directed or countenanced the
doing of the act complained of. But there is no pretence for so
charging the defendants here: they contracted with Warren to
lay down the kerb-stone in a particular way, not to so place the
stones, and so negligently leave them, as to occasion injury to the
plaintiff." 86
"I apprehend, that, if the defendants had been present, and
directed or sanctioned the doing of the act complained of, they
would have been responsible for it." 81
·
"The true result of the evidence here was, that the defendants
had nothing whatever to do with the wrongful act complained
of. They employed somebody to do something, which might be
done either in a proper or an improper manner; and he did it in
a negligent and improper manner, and injury resulted to the
plaintiff. . .. There is no pretence here for saying that the
defendants employed Russell to do the work in question in the
particular manner in which he did it." 38
Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499 at 507, 151 Eng. Rep. 509 (1840).
Milligan v. Wedge, 12 Adol. & El. 737 at 741, 113 Eng. Rep. 993 (1840),
per Lord Denman, C. J.
86 Cresswell, J., in Overton v. Freeman, II Com. B. 867 at 873-874, 138 Eng.
Rep. 717 (1852).
87 Maule, J., ibid., I I Com. B. at 873.
88 Maule,J.,in Peachey v. Rowland, 13 Com. B. 182 at 185-186, 138 Eng.
Rep. 1167 (1853).
84

85
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The nearest to a case decided on this principle seems to be Burgess
v. Gray. 89 There the owner of houses engaged the contractor who had
built them to connect them with a drain in the street. The contractor
hired another to cart away a pile of rubbish remaining in the street
and charged this exact item to the owner. Plaintiff sued the owner for
injuries alleged to be due to the carter's failure to remove the entire
pile. In sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, the Court of Common
Pleas pointed out that, to escape liability, defendant must have parted
with the entire control of the work. It relied especially on this incident
to show that defendant had not so relinquished control: A policeman
had pointed out to defendant the dangerous condition of the street;
and defendant had promised to remedy it. Defendant had, the court said,
at least "sanctioned" his contractor's servant's act. But whatever may
be thought of the decision or logic of Burgess v. Gray, it is clear that
the court in it purported to apply the principle laid down in the dicta
quoted above.
This treatment of the question of control is not that evident in
Sadler v. H enlock and Boswell v. Laird and to which modern courts
have become accustomed. Rather, in the uncertain field of respondeat
superior, the liability of the master for the negligence of his servant,.
the court has turned for guidance to a more certain and indisputable
principle. It was established beyond doubt that a person, whethercalled master or principal, was liable for commanded acts. Control in
these cases is not important in the sense of Blackstone's rationalization
of the master's responsibility for his household's misdeeds, but as
evidence of that command which spells liability for the defendant
without reference to the vexed question of how far this vicarious liability should be extended.40 In such cases control must have meant
39
1 Com. B. 578, 135 Eng. Rep. 667 (1845). Cf. Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 EI. & BI. 767, II8 Eng. Rep. 955 (1853), in which the contractee'sliability was based upon its having engaged the contractor to excavate in the highwaywithout having leave from the public authorities to do so. Defendant was held liablefor personal injuries caused by the contractor's having left the street in disrepair.
40
This further enlightening passage occurs in the report of the argument of
Peachey v. Rowland, 13 Com. B. 182 at 183-185, 138 Eng. Rep. u67 (1853)::
"Piggott now moved for a new trial•••• The true rule upon this subject is that laid'
down in Burgess v. Gray • ••• Tindal, C. J., says there was evidence that the defendant was exercising a dominion over the work, and that the soil was placed upon:
the road with his consent, if not by his express direction. [Maule, J. Does not Overton v. Freeman govern this case?] It is submitted that it does not. [lerois, C. J.
Where is the distinction?] The law there laid down is not disputed; but the facts:
distinguish it. . • • Upon the evidence given in the present case, it is impossible tosay that Ansell, whose negligence caused the injury, was not the servant of the defendants. The defendants' carts were to be employed in carrying away the earth; and:

IVlrcHIGAN LAw REVIEW

not a theoretical "right to control" but rather actual interference and
superintendence. Only thus could the necessary fact of command of
the precise tortious act be established.
From consideration of this aspect of the control doctrine and from
the rather curious blank in the judicial history of its modern application, there seems to be reason for suspecting that the use of control
last above discussed must have served as a stepping stone from Blackstone's theorizing to the reaJly modern cases of the I 8 so's.

A

MODERN RIVAL FOR THE CONTROL THEORY OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

While the cop.trol test of the master-servant relation has not gone
completely unchallenged 41 in this first important field of its application, the materials for a rival criterion are rather to be found in a new
approach to the whole problem of vicarious liability. Its basis lies
somewhat hidden in Baty's statement concluding his summary of the
growth of the doctrine of respondeat superior quoted above: 42
"[Extension of the master's liability] cannot but operate to check
enterprise and to penalize commerce. The extension of jointstock enterprise with limited liability alone makes the consequences of the doctrine tolerable. One unjuridical institution is
inelegantly cured by another." 43
But Baty's view is directly contrary to the modern analysis mentioned. 44 The latter looks rather to the countervailing doctrine, of
Evans admitted that he was on the spot, and saw the objectionable way in which Ansell
was doing the work. Can it be said,-as is put by Tindal, C. J., in Burge11 v. Gray,
-that the defendants had parted with all control over the work? [Maule, J. The
contractor employs a sub-contractor to do a certain thing,-to do it in a proper manner. I do not say there might not be such thing as a contractor employing another to
do that which would be a public nuisance. There is no pretence here for saying that
the defendants were the persons who committed the nuisance. Can you shew that they
ordered the thing complained of to be done? ] The question is, whether they, by
themselves or by their servants, wrongfully permitted the soil to remain on the road.
[Maule,- J. If the thing complained of,-that is, the work which the defendant procure!i to be done,-could not be done otherwise than in an unlawful manner, no
doubt they would be responsible for the consequences. But, unless you can shew that
the work was so done that the defendants might have been indicted for obstructing a
public highway, they are not liable in this action. . . . ] "
41 See Leidy, "Salesmen as Independent Contractors," 28 MICH. L. REv. 365
(1930), criticizing the orthodox test as uncertain of application and of doubtful
relation to the purpose of the doctrine. Professor Leidy suggests that more use be made
of the test of the independent calling of the alleged contractor.
42 Supra, at note I 2.
48 Baty, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 7 (1916).
44 See, in general, Douglas, "Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk,"
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independent contractor and non-liability, as a protection to enterprise
and a stimulus to commerce. How far entrepreneurs should be allowed
thus to insulate themselves from liability is a far-reaching question of
public policy; 45 opposed to the desirability of stimulating enterprise
is the practical necessity of caring somehow for persons injured in the
course of enterprise.46 And the present tendency seems to be towards
further securing the latter interest at the expense of "encouraged haphazard exploitation." 47
The definition of servant or employee is, then, part of the general
question of how the risk and cost of injuries should be borne. That
risk and cost are considered as resting ultimately upon society as a
whole in any case. So the problem is to be looked at as one of administration of risks. Three aims of this administration, at least, can be
discerned: stimulation toward redu~tion ~f the costs by preventing
injuries; 48 minimizing the administrative expense of shifting and
distributing that cost; 49 and, so far as is reasonably possible, securing
all persons against the risk of serious loss from tortious injuries. 50
To these ~ims the ordinary control test ( to determine for whose
torts the "employer" is responsible) is almost completely irrelevant. 51
The exception lies in the first aim: prevention of injury. 52 The person
who has most nearly complete knowledge and control of an "employee's" activities will be in the best position to introduce and enforce
safety measures.
A QUANTITATIVE TEST

If the control test can properly be criticized thus in its original
sphere of application, how much more inappropriate it must be for
further and extended application, for instance as the basis of a system
38 YALE L. J. 584, 720 (1929); Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good
Life,'' 2 UNiv. Cm. L. REV. 501 (1935).
45 Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," 2 UNIV. CHI. L. REv.
501, esp. at 531-532 (1935).
46 See Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1916).
u Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the Good Life," 2 UNIV. Cm. L.
REv. 501 at 532 (1935).
48 See Douglas, "Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk," 38 YALE
L. ]. 584 at 587-588, 598, 601 (1929).
49 Ibid., at 591, 599.
50 See Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1916).
51 Douglas, "Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk," 38 YALE L. J.
584 at 602 (1929).
52 Ibid., at 601 and note 39, p. 602. Leidy, "Salesmen as Independent Contractors," 28 MicH. L. REv. 365 (1930), particularly urges the "independent calling" test as better sui tcd to th is objective.
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of social insurance. Yet, since there was no substitute apparent, the
Internal Revenue Bureau quite naturally turned to the old criterion
in its regulations for the enforcement of the new social security taxes. 53
But whatever may be the proper test of it, there can be no doubt
of the utility of the employment relation itself as a basis of social
insurance systems. The pioneer form in the United States is, of course,
workmen's compensation; and after thirty years of operation it shows
no signs of departing from its original base. This industrial accident
insurance system is one of the great sources of the more recent social
security legislation. The other great source, even older,5 lies in the
social insurance systems of the major European nations. They too are
based almost unanimously upon the employment relation. 65 Such long
and widespread use of the concept, it seems, must surely be founded
on characteristics of that relation which may eventually be developed
into a more rational criterion than that of the power of control.
In explanation of the doctrine of respondeat superior there has
been proposed a new theory of administration of risk. 66 A parallel idea
underlies discussion of one aspect of the employment relation as used
in workmen's compensation acts. Many such acts expressly exclude
from their coverage employment termed "casual." 61 And Professor
Bohlen's remarks in connection with his discussion of this exception 68
seem to merit a wider application than he gave them.
The chief and classical exposition of the economics of workmen's
compensation is that the financial cost of accidents 69 ought to be
4,

68

See TREAS. REG. 90, Art. 205 (1936); TREAS, REG, 91, Art. 3 (1936).
The earliest compulsory contributory pension plan created by state action was
established in France in 1673 for seamen. The genesis of effective modern social
insurance covering wide sectors of the population, however, is to be sought in Germany, where Bismarck inaugurated a comprehensive program 1881-1889. See ARMSTRONG, lNsURING THE ESSENTIALS 398-400 (1932); Armstrong, "Old-Age Security
Abroad," 3 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 175 at 176-179 (1936).
55
Exceptions are the Swedish system and those of three cantons of Switzerland.
See U. S. CoMMITTEE ON EcoNOMIC SECURITY, SocIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA
185 (1937). The former, at least, is not considered to have operated very successfully
on this account.
66
Supra, subdivision beginning at page 198.
57
See, e.g., 2 Cal. Codes (Deering, 193 7) , Labor Code, § 33 5 2 (a) ; 3 Minn.
Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1938) § 4272-4; 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939), § 22 (a).
68
Bohlen, "Casual Employment and Employment Outside of Business," 11 CAL.
L. REV, 221 (1923).
69
Only the pecuniary risk, of course, can be shifted from the employee. And only
part of that risk is cared for. By fixing standard and relatively low compensation rates
the states have abandoned the common-law theory of damages: full monetary restitution. See I CAMPBELL, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATioN § 30 (1935).
5

4,
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treated as a part of the expense of production, made an element in the
price of goods, and so passed on to the ultimate consumer. 60 But the
final incidence of any such charge is a doubtful and complicated matter. 61 A more certain and tangible benefit has been recognized in the
insurance principle, the distribution of risk. 62 Putting the cost of
industrial accidents on the employer spreads the risk of loss wider
than does leaving it on the individual employee; but still there is no
very wide distribution, especially for the employer of only a few
workers. Insurance of the risk is much more satisfactory:
"[Its function] is to spread and distribute this burden over a
sufficiently great body of persons employed in a particular occupation to give an insurable accident exposure. The burden imposed
upon an industry taken as a whole is slight, the addition to the
cost of producing the commodity astonishingly small, yet a single
serious injury or death, one of the many which must be expected
in the industry as a whole, if it happens to a workman employed
by an employer with a small business employing only a few men,
may well ruin him if he has to pay the appropriate compensation
himself. Yet it would probably be mere chance that his workman
rather than a workman of one of his competitors was the victim
of this accident. It is the function of insurance to reduce this
chance, this gamble on ruin or immunity, to distribute this risk
over so large a number of workmen pursuing the same occupation as to give an accident exposure sufficient to enable actuarial
experience to calculate the average risk per unit of payroll and so
fix a fair but adequate premium as the price of securing protection against liability under compensation acts." 68
From this administrative viewpoint, then, the characteristics of
an employment to be included in the compensation system will be
those necessary to economical and practical application of insurance.
The most essential would seem to be the centralization of enough
employment or risk about a single "employer" so that it will be both
possible and economical to collect premiums and otherwise administer
accounts. Marking the line between risks which will be carried and
those considered too uneconomical to administer is obviously a ques60

I BRADBURY, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATioN, 2d ed., § 1 (1914); DowNEY,
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION 15 (1924).
61
See DoWNEY, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION 19, note 30 (1924).
62
Ibid., lac. cit.
63
Bohlen, "Casual Employment and Employment Outside of Business," 11
CiiL. L. 'REv. 221 at 236 (1923).
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tion of policy for the legislatures, and they may be expected to differ
on the point.
These observations are equally applicable to any system of social
insurance and should serve to accent the characteristics of the normal
employment relation which give it its great utility in such legislation.
In the first place an employer is thought of as an entity as opposed to
a number of individual workmen whom he employs. By dealing
through employers the public enforcing agency or insurance organization involved makes the administrative savings which alone make
a compulsory social insurance scheme feasible. Again, the habitual
association together of both employer and his workmen creates an
economic unit whose existence is generally well known, so that enforcement of obligations by the authorities is not a difficult matter.
Even if the effort were financially justifiable, enforcement against
unaffiliated individuals would be impossible in many cases. And
finally the periodic wage accountings characteristic of the usual employment relation create convenient sources of funds for the payment
of contributions and taxes under social security legislation.
The contentions above are reenforced and illustrated by some
departures from employment as the basis of coverage in foreign social
insurance systems. In England, for example, old age and allied pension and health insurance legislation is applicable to one class of "independent contractors;" i.e., lessees or bailees of vessels or vehicles which
are to be plied for hire. 0 "' But note that the person from whom the vessel
or vehicle is obtained is to be considered as if he were the employer of
the lessee or bailee. In France certain share farmers are included on
much the same terms, with their lessors, again, treated as employers.65
In such instances as these there is obviously no reliance placed on the
element of control in the relation involved, but the advantages of the
employment relation are preserved by substituting another relation
involving a similar course of regular dealing.
For a test of the employment relation as used in such legislation
as workmen's compensation and the more recent social security program insurance schemes 66 it is submitted that an almost purely quan64, National Health Insurance Act, 1936, 26 Geo. 5 & I Edw. 8, c. 32, First
Schedule, Part I; Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1936,
26 Geo. 5 & I Edw. 8, c. 33, § 2.
65 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, STUDIES AND REPORTS, Ser. M, No. 1 3,
"International Survey of Social Services," pp. 230-231 (1936).
Ge By way of contrast, consider another use of the employment relation to which
the control test is equally foreign: the preference granted to employees' wages in
insolvency statutes (see note 2, supra). Any criterion suggested for use with social
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titative criterion may be desirable. It will not be simple: several factors may appear. At least two are fairly obvious and have already been
used in a limited sphere. Both are closely related to the theories of
administrative convenience propounded here. First, the proportion of
his time spent by an alleged employee in service 87 of a single putative
employer is important. 88 Perhaps even more important is the total
amount of such services used by an alleged employer.89 For it is this
latter factor particularly that will determine whether the employer
is an efficient and economical intermediary for the administration and
enforcement of a social insurance system.
The necessity for some such new criterion is apparent from the
relative failure of the control test to supply a satisfactory rationale for
the actual decisions under recent social .insurance legislation. There.
exists a widespread feeling among lawyers that the decisions and regulations of the Internal Revenue Bureau have been illogical and vacillating and hence quite unpredictable. 70 But such an objection can hardly
spring from the Bureau's choice of a novel theoretical base for its
decisions on the employment relation. For that base has been quite
uniformly the same control test with which lawyers are familiar. Its
opinions on the distinction between employees and independent contractors have been in general put carefully in terms of the control
insurance is likely to be quite inappropriate to the problem of preferences. For the
essence of the latter is that a limited number of claims must be selected for preferential
treatment in order to make that treatment effective, while in social insurance the
general objective is to increase coverage to the limit of practicability.
117
The difficulty in distinguishing employees from independent contractors is
aggravated by the fact that both render "service," the public utility to its customers
as well as the servant to his master.
88
This principle is apparent in, e.g., the exception of casual employees from the
scope of workmen's compensation acts. See supra, at note 57.
119
This principle is illustrated by a development of some of the workmen's
compensation statutes exempting casual employment. These three restrict their definitions of "casual" to undertakings which are to be completed in not exceeding ten
working days and on which labor is to cost less than $100. 2 Cal. Codes (Deering,
1937), Labor Code, § 3354; 5 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws {Perm. Supp. 1938), §
5966(2); 2 Nev. Comp. Laws {Hillyer 1929), § 2688. See also a similar presumption
laid down for the Social Security Act taxes by the Internal Revenue Bureau. Mim.
4847, 17 lNT. REV. BuL., Part 2, p. 310 (1938).
70
It is the writer's opinion that this view probably is held without any comprehensive acquaintance with the decisions criticized. After a study of those of the Internal
Revenue Bureau covering a period of nearly three years and dealing with the employment relation, he believes that they exhibit an internal consistency not to be compared
unfavorably with those of other courts or administrative tribunals, even taking into
account the short period of time they cover.
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criterion. It must be, then, that the objection to the holdings is to
particular results rather than to their theoretical basis. The Bureau and
its critics are ostensibly agreed on the theory but reach inconsistent conclusions.
While reaching diverse results from a single theoretical assumption
is not a unique phenomenon, the control test seems to lend itself particularly well to such confusion. For the very multitude of matters of
fact which are to be considered in the determination of whether the
right of control exists 71 evidences the vagueness of the criterion. One
end which vagueness may actually serve is the defeat of attempts to ·
evade the spirit, so-called, of the social security legislation: the careful
drawing by employers' counsel of service contracts to present the
appearance of an independent relation while retaining to the employer
the substantial benefits of the employment relation. If the control test
were plain and simply applied, such contracts would be sure protection
to those for whom they were drawn. Yet undoubtedly there would still
be the objection in some quarters that the spirit of the act was violated.
Such an objection is made possible by the irrelevancy of the control test
to the purposes of the social security legislation. The letter may be
upheld and the spirit violated because the two do not coincide. The
answer to the difficulty, a criterion more relevant to the purposes of the
act, should both give a greater measure of certainty and protect the
legislation from undermining attacks. A quantitative criterion of the
sort proposed should' offer certainty to a greater extent than is commonly found among legal tests. And if it is as appropriate as it seems,
the spirit and letter of the laws will have been made to coincide.
71
The cases are generally stated in terms of subsidiary tests or indicia of the
existence of the right of control. The Restatement is less clear on the point but seems
to imply the same approach. See note IO, supra.

